

inddraget langt flere forskningsbårne stemmer og beskrivelser. Goli og Resaei benytter sig i stor udstrækning af en enkelt forskers teori-apparat, som de umiddelbart applicerer til deres analyser og forståelse af fænomenet. Jeg vil fx stille mig skeptisk overfor, at brugen af hijab, ønsket om kendskab til arabisk, erkendelse af den muslimske Umma og viden om slaget ved Badr umiddelbart er direkte relateret til politisk og radikal islam (s. 51). Det kan de *også* være, men ikke-radikaliserede, ikke-politiske muslimer kan sagtens også bruge dem og anerkende dem. Her er der virkelig tale om en knivsæg mellem kategorier, hvor forfatterne har svært ved at balancere.

Forfatterne understreger problemet med kausalitet, men en forstået kausalitet løber egentligt igennem hele værket: At der er en forbindelse mellem islam og radikalisering. Det havde været et absolut givende aspekt for rapporten, at forfatterne havde inddraget mere fokus på den kontrolgruppe af ikke-muslimer, som de meget kort introducerer i starten af rapporten, og endnu bedre, hvis kontrolgruppen var blevet suppleret med personer af keredansk, ikke-muslimsk baggrund – gerne med inddragelse af spørgsmål om almen kendt viden om kristendommen (de spørgsmål kunne alle jo godt få!). Sammenligningen havde kunnet bidrage med yderlig dybde i undersøgelsen.

En sidste ting, som jeg mangler mere af, er analyser af, hvad den danske kontekst egentligt betyder for de besvarelser, som undersøgelsen diskuterer med. Der er tale om et studie af muslimer og radikalisering af muslimer i Danmark – og ikke mindst givet, hvordan debat og fokus, for ikke at forglemme internationalt militært engagement og tegninge-krise har skabt et nærmest konstant politisk og samfundsmæssigt fokus på islam, kunne det have været rigtigt interessant at se, hvad effekten heraf havde været.

Men som Goli og Rezaei egentligt siger: Rapporten indeholder nogle byggesten, som man kan lege videre med, for på sigt at komme nærmere forståelse af et rigtigt svært fænomen. Det er også sådan, at jeg tror, at rapporten på sigt vil blive læst og benyttet.

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Lene Kühle and Lasse Lindekilde, *Radicalization among young Muslims in Aarhus. Report from the Centre for Studies in Islamism and Radicalization (CIR), January 2010, 148 pages. Kan downloades gratis fra CIRs hjemmeside, <http://www.ps.au.dk/forskning/instituttets-forskningscentre/cir>*

Within the last decade, and in particular after the London bombings of 2005, “radicalization” has become a keyword for understanding and managing “homegrown” terrorism. It is no secret that Muslims have been particularly targeted in that respect. In a recent report – “Radicalization among young Muslims in Aarhus” – Lene Kühle and Lasse Lindekilde delve into precisely this issue. Research on terrorism and radicalization seriously lacks in empirical studies, and this report fills out a gap, since it is built on interviews with Muslims from the so-called “ASC-milieu” (Arab-Somali-Convert milieu) in Aarhus. The ASC-milieu – which is also termed “Salafi” – has been chosen among other things, because it is considered as a “target-group” of various de-radicalization-programs.

The title of the report is ambiguous. One could expect an empirical study of how young Muslims

in Aarhus have become radicalized or at least involved in radical environments. But this is not the case. More precisely, the ambition of the report is to examine and nuance the concept of “radicalization”. How is a term like “radicalization” conceived of in an environment that from the outside might appear as “radical”? And do radicalization-discourses and de-radicalization programs have counterproductive effects? Hence, the aim of the authors is not merely to apply a preconceived concept such as “radicalization”, but more ambitiously to examine how this concept is perceived *from within*. From this knowledge they want to introduce “a completely new approach to radicalization”. (101)

The report is divided into three parts. Initially, the report takes the concept of radicalization under closer scrutiny. Radicalization is generally understood as an individual process that implies “acceptance” or “support” to radical groups as well as opposition to democracy. A main finding of the first part of the report is that within the ASC-milieu, there is substantial support for groups listed on US terror-list such as Hamas, Taleban or al-Shabaab, and that quite a few hold undemocratic opinions. Hence, according to current definitions of radicalization, the ASC-milieu could count as “radicalized”.

But the authors introduce some nuances to this picture. First, the acceptance or support to violent groups is in no way unconditional. If there is large support to what is considered legitimate warfare in Muslim countries, there is very little support to unwarranted violence against civilians in the West.

Second, the report makes a distinction between *undemocratic* and *anti-democratic* attitudes. If many people in the milieu were indeed

undemocratic in the sense that they did not take part in elections or did prefer an Islamic state to democracy, none were straightforward anti-democratic in the sense that they actively tried to implement an Islamic state or the rule of sharia in Denmark. As the stigmatization of large groups as “radicalized” seems counter-productive, the report recommends that definitions of radicalization takes those nuances into consideration.

Having pinpointed some of the dark sides of the concept of “radicalization”, the report suggests that the ASC-milieu could more appropriately be described as a “cultic milieu”. “Cultic milieu” is a term coined by Colin Campbell in 1972, which designates a counterculture with deviant views and a lack of both organizational structure and fixed dogma. A cultic milieu constitutes “the cultural underground of a society”.

The report suggests that a part of such a milieu *could* eventually radicalize. With reference to a concept of radicalization formulated by Ehud Sprinzak – and to some extent inspired by social movement theory – the authors suggest that radicalization in a cultic milieu is to a large extent triggered by conflicts with authorities (police etc.) and takes place in three “phases”: 1) a “crisis of confidence”, where confidence to authorities is eroded, 2) a “legitimacy conflict”, where the whole regime is questioned, and 3) a “crisis of legitimacy”, where the opposition to a regime turns into the preparedness to kill people.

In the very last chapter, the report sets out to examine how Muslims in the ASC-milieu perceive de-radicalization initiatives and how they assess the effects of such policies.

The added value of the report is that it is based on interviews and therefore gives a glimpse into a “target-group” of many de-radicalization

measures. This underpinning allows the authors to draw a nuanced picture of a target-group and also point to some of the problems inherent in current discourses on radicalization. As such, it is more interesting and informing than most literature on radicalization.

However, from an academic point of view some loose ends remain. Compared to the level of ambitions, the report appears to be somewhat preliminary, and the attempt to develop a new approach to radicalization does not necessarily avoid the pitfalls of the current definitions.

The report introduces a distinction between an “etic” approach – using categories produced by scientists (or practitioners?), which are foreign to the everyday lives of most Muslims – and an “emic” approach – trying to understand practices and categories from within, as they are used and identified by Muslims themselves. The authors have the ambition of adopting an “emic” approach (14) and “often” succeed in opening up for “alternative categories, distinctions and focuses.” (19). But those emic categories are never unpacked. Of course, the report tells us how “etic” concepts are viewed from within, and whether they matter or are marginal to persons within the milieu or not, but it hardly goes *beyond* these “etic” concepts and gives us a glimpse of truly “emic” grammars, categories or conceptualizations.

If for instance we take a glance at the concept of democracy, the report introduces a useful distinction between “undemocratic” and “anti-democratic”. I suppose this distinction is formulated by the authors (and not the interviewees), since it corresponds to a typology of practices within the ASC-milieu. It is indeed a very valuable distinction, since it nuances our knowledge of the ASC-milieu and provides

interesting information about how *in practice* people from this milieu relate to “democracy”. But does it unfold alternative categories merging from within the milieu that take us beyond the “etic” concept of “democracy”? I think, democracy works as an “etic” category that the interviewees can comply with, reject or relate to in different ways, but no real “emic” category emerges in that respect.

As mentioned the report has the ambition and courage to introduce “a completely new approach to radicalization”. (101). At a closer look, however, the “completely new approach” appears to be somewhat old, since – as mentioned – it is formulated by Sprinzak in 1990. But the question is not whether the conception is old, but whether it is adequate for understanding “radicalization” today in a very different context. The added value of Sprinzak’s understanding of radicalization is 1) that it considers radicalization as a *group-process*, 2) suggests that radicalization is triggered by *conflicts with authorities*, and 3) describes the last phase of radicalization as “a situation, where the use of *violence against the state* is considered legitimate.” (102). There might be some truth to this, and according to the report, the “Tunisian-case”, where two people were administratively expelled, did indeed lead to a “crisis of confidence” in the ASC-milieu (the first level of radicalization). But does that allow for a more general thesis of radicalization that escapes the flaws of the more recent ones?

First, I think that the “crisis of confidence” that followed the Tunisian-case was to be found in many segments of Danish society and was not limited to the ASC-milieu or likeminded environments. So if – as the report wisely suggests – it is counterproductive to stigmatize large groups as “radicalized”, I’m not convinced

that Sprinzak provides a solution. Moreover one could argue that with Sprinzak, the ASC-milieu is even radicalized at level 2 – “legitimacy conflict” – since a substantial part of people in the ASC-milieu to some extent questions the Danish democratic regime. So again following Sprinzak, we hardly avoid stigmatizing the ASC-milieu milieu as a *radicalized* cultic milieu.

Second, the report points to a “specific conflict” with “specific authorities” as the trigger-cause of radicalization. At an empirical level, this might have been the case with the Weathermen and other radical groups of the 70’s, but is that the most conspicuous trigger-cause today? If we look beyond the ASC-milieu to recent cases in Denmark, where people were actually convicted for terrorism (Glostrup, Vollsmose, Glasvej), there is to my knowledge no evidence of this. My point is not that conflicts with specific authorities could not lead to radicalization in some cases, but merely that *as a general thesis* of radicalization in the current context it appears to be questionable.

Similarly, Sprinzak’s idea of the final phase of radicalization as a situation, where “the use of violence *against the state* is considered legitimate” might have been adequate in the 1970’s, but not necessarily today, where legitimate targets – despite the *discourse* in the ASC-milieu – could very well be civilians. Within the last two years, the Danish cartoonist Kurt Vestergaard supposedly was the target of two plans and one attempt of attack. My point is not that Sprinzak’s understanding is wrong, but that it is coined in a very different historical and geographical context and does not convincingly solve the problems involved in current definitions of radicalization.

Despite those comments, I find the report to be one of the best I have read so far on the controversial subject of radicalization. It is both nuanced and supported by empirical evidence. A must-read for anyone in the “radicalization-business”.

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Lissi Rasmussen: *Livshistorier og Kriminalitet. En empirisk undersøgelse af etnisk minoritetsunge i Københavns Fængsler, deres baggrund, status og fremtid. Hvilke kommunikationsmuligheder er der?*

Center for Europæisk Tænkning (CEIT), Det Teologiske Fakultet, Københavns Universitet, 2010, 236 sider. Bogen kan downloades gratis fra

http://www.teol.ku.dk/afd/ceit/lissi_rasmussen_rapport

Spørgsmålet om sammenhængen mellem risikofaktorer og kriminel adfærd, mellem livshistorie og kriminel løbebane, er en gammel diskussion. Men det gør det ikke desto mindre relevant, især når perspektivet bliver analyseret i forhold til etniske minoritetsunge, da denne kategori desværre i stigende grad dæmoniseres i den politiske debat. Lissi Rasmussens bog er et veldokumenteret bud på en videnskabelig valid og empirisk overbevisende analyse, som går bag de hurtige populistiske konklusioner af ”den etniske minoritetsindsattes” årsager til kriminalitet.

Formålet med undersøgelsen er dels at undersøge de unges egen fortælling om hvorfor, de er havnet i kriminalitet, dels at udvikle nogle social-pædagogiske praktiske redskaber til bedre at kunne kommunikere med de etniske minoritets-